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Abstract 
 
The amount of electric energy used by customers is usually not controlled. Utility system 
operators must schedule generators to provide the electricity needed by customers. Although the 
amount of energy delivered in an hour is generally controllable with certain precision for 
conventional generators, the energy actually generated is not always exactly the same as the 
energy scheduled in an hour. The difference between energy scheduled and actually used or 
generated is the imbalance energy. The energy imbalance service tariff is designed to discipline 
the power market by promoting better scheduling and discouraging unfavorable generator 
operating practices. Because of the variable nature of wind, the difference between predicted and 
actual generated wind energy is inevitable despite progress made in wind forecasting. It is 
obvious that an energy imbalance tariff that is designed to penalize generators that intentionally 
deviate from schedule will have a negative impact on wind energy. 
 
In early 2007 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order 890, which 
adopted a tiered approach to energy and generation imbalance. This paper summarizes the results 
of a study that uses actual wind power data collected by NREL and actual hourly energy prices 
of the Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator to analyze the impact of FERC 
energy imbalance tariff on wind power. Sensitivities of the results to various components of the 
imbalance tariff, such as different deviation band widths and penalty stipulations, were simulated, 
and the effects of improving wind forecasting accuracy were also tested. 
 
The study shows the design of the penalty for energy deviation has a roughly 2% impact on wind 
plant revenue. Other factors studied, such as improving wind forecasting accuracy, can 
somewhat reduce but not eliminate this impact. 
 
Introduction 
 
Energy imbalance service is one of the ancillary services specified in the Open Access 
Transmission Tariff by FERC Order No. 888. The amount of energy consumed by load in a 
given time frame is variable and usually not controllable. System operators have to schedule 
generators to serve the load. While the amount of energy delivered in a given time is generally 
controllable with certain precision for conventional generators, the energy actually generated is 
not always exactly the same as the energy scheduled during the same time. The difference 
between energy scheduled and actually used or generated in an hour is the imbalanced energy 
that needs to be provided by system operators. The energy imbalance service tariff is designed to 
promote system reliability by encouraging better scheduling and by discouraging unfavorable 
operating practices, such as intentional deviation from a schedule. The energy imbalance service 
is applicable to both load and generation. However in this report this term is used exclusively for 
generation imbalance. 
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In early 2007 FERC issued Order 8901, which adopted a tiered approach to energy imbalance. 
Under the FERC order the hourly energy imbalances (either over or under schedule) of less than 
or equal to 1.5% of the scheduled energy (or 2 MW, whichever is larger) will be netted out on a 
monthly basis and settled at actual incremental or decremental cost. Imbalances outside this band 
will be charged 110% of system incremental cost for the amount of energy under-delivered (the 
actual energy delivered during the hour is less than that scheduled) and will only be paid 90% of 
the system decremental cost for the amount over-delivered (the actual energy delivered during 
the hour is more than that scheduled). This is equivalent to a 10% penalty for energy imbalance 
that is outside the 1.5% deviation band. The deviation band offers operating flexibility and 
penalties discourage unfavorable generator operating practices.2 
 
Wind energy is variable in nature. Despite the significant progress made in wind forecasting, 
some difference between predicted and actually generated hourly wind energy is inevitable. It is 
obvious that these deliberately imposed energy imbalance tariffs will have a negative impact on 
wind. This study uses actual wind power data and real-time prices to examine such impacts on 
wind plant's revenue. 
 
Data and Simulation 
 
Actual hourly average wind power data time series of a wind plant (nameplate capacity 103 MW) 
located in the Midwest region are used in this analysis. The actual hourly outputs are derived 
from the 1-second data series NREL collected at the wind plant. To produce the hourly time 
series that represents the forecasted (scheduled) hourly output which is finalized 80 minutes 
before the start of the hour (–80 minutes), the average wind power generated during the previous 
60 minutes (i.e., the period from –80 minutes to –140 minutes) was calculated. This represents a 
simple wind energy forecasting strategy based on wind persistency. The imbalance is the 
difference between the actual wind power produced and the scheduled power during the hour and 
is further separated into two categories (within the 1.5% band or without) in this analysis. The 
simulation is carried out for 2003, 2004, and 2005, and the imbalance was tallied hourly, 
monthly and yearly. 
 
The hourly cost data are based on Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator (MISO) 
day ahead hourly prices from April 1, 2005 to March 31, 2006 (total 12 months). The overall 
average hourly price for this data set is $44.38/MWh. The highest hourly price is $362.96/MWh 
and the lowest hourly price is -$3.61/MWh. There are actually 52 hours of negative prices in the 
yearly data set (about 0.6% of the time). Not surprisingly, the high hourly prices tend to occur 
around late afternoon (4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.), early evening (between 7:0 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.) 
and morning hours (8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m.) while the low hourly prices tend to occur around 
early morning hours (from midnight to 7:00 a.m.). Figure 1 shows the hourly prices of two 7-day 
periods. The period from May 24 to May 30 had the lowest average hourly price at $23.61/MWh 
while the period from December 3 to December 9 had the highest average hourly price at 
$212.46/MWh. Despite the huge differences in hourly prices during these periods, the distinctive 
                                                 
1 FERC Docket Nos. RM05-17-000 and RM05-25-000, Order 890. 
2 The FERC order actually contains three deviation bands for energy imbalances: less than 1.5%, between 1.5% and 
7.5%, and above 7.5%. The 90%/110% rule applies only to the second band (between 1.5% and 7.5%). Higher 
penalties are applied to the imbalances greater than 7.5% of the scheduled energy. However, wind energy is 
exempted from the third band. 
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pattern of daily price variation is still clear. Although the hourly price data used in the analysis 
are not the actual system prices used for settlement during the three test years, it is a reasonable 
approximation. The results are still useful in providing an insight of the impact on wind energy. 
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Figure 1.  Examples of hourly energy prices 
 
In this analysis, it is assumed that a wind plant operator will receive a base payment equal to 
scheduled energy multiplied by the hourly price. The hourly energy imbalance within the 
deviation band (both over- and under-delivery) will be netted out at the end of the month and 
settled at monthly average hourly prices. It can be either a payment or a charge to the wind plant 
operators depending on the sign of the netted energy (positive for over-delivery and negative for 
under-delivery). When the hourly imbalance is outside the 1.5% band, the wind plant operators 
will receive an additional payment equal to the amount of the imbalance over 1.5% multiplied by 
90% of the energy price for the hour3 for over-delivery (i.e., the actual generation is more than 
the scheduled amount). For under-delivery (the actual generation is less than the scheduled 
amount for the hour), the wind plant operators will be charged an amount equal to the imbalance 
outside the deviation band multiplied by 110% of the energy price for the hour.4 
 
To establish a baseline revenue for the year so we can compare the effects of different deviation 
band widths and forecasting accuracies, a theoretical maximum revenue for each test year is 
calculated by assuming the wind energy will be paid at the hourly price for actual energy 
generated. The resulting revenues can be interpreted as the revenue for the wind plant operators 
with perfect hourly forecasting (the scheduled wind power is always equal to the actual wind 
generation every hour) or no energy imbalance penalty. This number is thus independent of the 
deviation band width and 90%/110% rule (or any other similar rules). Any revenue deviation 
from this number reflects a deliberately imposed penalty on wind power because of an 
                                                 
3 This should be the system hourly incremental price.  In this analysis the hourly energy prices are used for both the 
incremental and decremental prices. 
4 Id. 
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inadvertent forecasting inaccuracy. Table 1 lists the maximum revenues and average per kWh 
prices along with the actual annual wind generation and total scheduled energy (simulated) for 
the three test years. 
 
Table 1 shows that the simple persistence method tends to over-forecast the wind power. For the 
3 test years, the scheduled wind energy is higher than the actual wind generation, ranging from 
0.5% to 1.4% higher. The table also shows that even with the identical hourly prices, natural 
variations of wind energy production from year to year will result in different annual average 
kWh prices. The average prices calculated from the actual wind generation are also lower than 
the average hourly price of the hourly price data set itself. With the maximum revenue based on 
actual production, the average prices for the 3 test years range from 4.291¢/kWh to 4.436¢/kWh 
—all of which are lower than the 4.438¢/kWh price calculated from data set itself. It appears that 
the distribution of actual wind energy generation does not match the distribution of hourly prices. 
The wind at this location tends to produce more electricity during low price periods than during 
high price periods. 
 
Table 1.  Maximum Revenue Case 
 2003 2004 2005 
Wind Generation (MWh)    
Actual 313,771 244,655 283,378 
Scheduled (from simulation) 313,803 244,667 283,418 
% Increase 1.0% 0.5% 1.4% 
Max Revenue ($000), Actual 13,918 10,548 12,161 
Average Unit Price (¢/kWh) 4.436 4.312 4.291 
    
Max Revenue ($000), Scheduled 13,855 10,530 12,097 
Average Unit Price (¢/kWh) 4.415 4.304 4.268 
% Change over Actual (0.47%) (0.19%) (0.54%) 
 
The table also shows that despite the fact that the total scheduled energy (based on the 
persistence method) for the year is slightly higher than the actual production of the year, the 
maximum revenues based on the total scheduled energy (i.e., wind be paid for the scheduled 
energy at the hourly price) are less than those based on actual production. For example using 
2003 data, total actual hourly production of 313,771 MWh will generate a revenue of 
$13,917,627 while the total scheduled hourly energy of 313,803 MWh will only generate 
$13,855,497. 
 
More energy (scheduled) resulting in less revenue highlights the linkage between the hours of 
high price and the hours when wind is producing electricity, but more factors are in play here. A 
brief discussion is provided below. 
 
Actual revenues are consistently higher than forecasted in this case because of the nature of the 
persistence forecast, the typical daily wind pattern in this region, and the nature of power price 
fluctuations. Figure 2 provides a stylized example to help explain the phenomena. The example 
is stylized to emphasize the differences. Power price (dark blue) follows a typical daily load 
pattern with an afternoon peak. Wind output (green) shows a similar pattern but typically peaks 
about 5 hours later than load and price. As is not uncommon, the wind pattern does not perfectly 
match the daily load or price pattern and in fact tends to provide more energy during off-peak 
hours. In this case, the wind pattern lags the daily price pattern by a few hours. Because the 
persistence forecast (dotted blue) lags the actual wind output, the forecasted wind production is 
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even farther off-peak than the actual wind production; the persistence forecast understates the 
value of wind generation. The wind forecast error energy (dashed red) is symmetric with equal 
over- and under-production but the value of the error energy (purple) is not symmetric. The net 
area under the purple curve is positive. Actual wind overproduction tends to happen at a time 
when power prices are high (afternoon) so the wind plant gets paid 90% of a high price for the 
forecast error energy. Wind underproduction tends to happen in the early morning when energy 
is cheap so even though the wind generator has to pay 110% of the market price for the forecast 
error this is at a relatively low price time. 
0:00 4:00 8:00 12:00 16:00 20:00 0:00
Energy Price Wind Output
Wind Forecast Forecast Error
Forecast Error Payment
 
Figure 2. Actual payments exceed forecasted because of the wind pattern and the nature of 
persistence forecasts. 
 
This extra revenue may not be considered a bonus for the wind generator. It is the forecast error 
that results in the Max Revenue Scheduled being below the Max Revenue Actual. In fact, an 
improved forecast would increase both numbers because it would reduce the 10% out-of-band 
penalty as well as reduce the extent to which the forecast error overstates the off-peak nature of 
the wind production. Note that if the wind pattern had high production early in the day, before 
the load and price picked up, the persistence forecast would tend to move the forecasted 
production into the peak and would overstate the value of the wind. Actual revenue would be 
below forecasted. 
 
After establishing the baseline, test cases were run with FERC energy imbalance rules and with 
variations of rules such as different deviation band widths and improved forecasting accuracy. 
To simulate the improvement in forecasting (scheduling), the hourly imbalance from the 
persistence method is artificially reduced by a fixed ratio. For example, to simulate a 15% 
improvement over the simple persistence method, the hourly imbalance from the persistence 
method is multiplied by a factor of 0.85 and the scheduled energy for the hour is adjusted to 
reflect the reduced imbalance. The industry experience has shown that actual forecasting 
accuracy with sophisticated numerical models and real time weather data and wind plant outputs 
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is 5% to 25% better than the persistence method. Forecasting improvements of 15% and 25% are 
simulated in this analysis. 
 
 
 
Summary of Simulation Results 
. The FERC Rule (Base Case) 
ith the ±1.5% deviation band and 90%/110% rule for imbalance energy outside the band, 
he 
and 
Table 2.  Base Case (±1.5% Deviation Band and with 90%/110% Rule) 
 
1
 
W
annual wind plant revenues will be reduced. Table 2 lists the simulation results. On average t
wind plant revenues will be decreased by about 1.9% compared to the maximum revenues with 
no deviation band (for the 3 test years of 2003, 2004, and 2005, the percentages range from 
1.71% to 2.11%). Table 3 shows the monthly average hourly prices, monthly netted energy, 
costs (payment or charge) associated with the in-band netting for the 3 test years. 
 
±1.5% Deviation Band 2003 2004 2005 
Imbalance (MWh)    
Total Over-Delivery 32,71 2 32,67
T
Revenue ($000) 
Base Pay 13,85 10,53
 P
Sum
1 1
Unit Pri  
) )
1 32,59  2 
Inside Band
otal Un
7,053 
(3
6,790 
(3
6,981 
(3der-Delivery 2,743) 2,605) 2,712) 
Inside Band (7,074) (6,936) (7,106) 
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0
 
12,098ment    
Outside Band ayment @90% 1,047 1,004 1,026 
Outside Band Charge @110% (1,222) (1,203) (1,183) 
 of Inside Band Monthly netting (0)* 
3,6
(6) 
0,3
(6) 
11,9Net (Monthly Netting)
ce (¢/kWh
80 25 35 
) 
et (Monthly Netting)
 
4.220
 
4.212 N
% Change over
4.360  
 Max Revenue Case (1.71% (2.11%) (1.86%  
*small negative amount less than 0 (see ) 
 
Table 3.  Summary of Monthly Imbalance within ±1.5% Deviation Band 
$1,000.0 Table 2
 
  2003 2004 2005 
 Average 
(
Month
Im
yment Month
Im
yment Month
Im
yment 
Hourly 
Price 
$/MWh) 
ly Pa
Net 
balance 
(MWh) 
or 
(Charge) 
($) 
ly Pa
Net 
balance 
(MWh) 
or 
(Charge) 
($) 
ly Pa
Net 
balance 
(MWh) 
or 
(Charge) 
($) 
Jan 37.98 7 272 (25) (942) (43) (1,614) 
Feb 40.52 (12) (506) 40  1
(1
(1,225) 
(37) (1
(32) (1 (
(1,436) 
y 44.38 ( (125) 
,602 10  410 
Mar 34.41 (51) ,769) (91) (3,116) 18  612 
Apr 38.92 74 2,886 1  36 
(1
(24) (915) 
May 28.81 (22) (622) (4) 27) (43) 
Jun 44.32 16 696 ,639) (25) (1,128) 
Jul 55.88 (2) (121) 52  2,882 20  1,126 
Aug 46.82 (1) (55) 23  1,059 4  
3
208 
1Sep 42.87 9 371 23  992 
2
8  ,614 
Oct 45.33 ,442) (61) ,787) (10) (449) 
Nov 42.92 (20) (843)
1,002 
(38) (1,622) (33) 
Dec 73.14 14 (28) (2,063) (38) (2,765) 
Yearl (21) (132) 146) (5,725) (5,562) 
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2. Sensitivity to Deviation Bandwidth 
o see how much change to the potential wind plant revenue would occur under a wider 
ected 
 
 case, 
Table 4.  10% Deviation Band with 90%/110% Rule 
±10% De 005 
 
T
deviation band, the same simulation was performed using a ±10% deviation band. As exp
the net revenue for the wind plant operators would increase, but only slightly (about 0.29% 
higher). However, they are still less than the base cases—ranging from 1.42% to 1.85% less.
Table 4 lists the results. Both the charge for under-delivery and additional payment for over-
delivery decrease as expected. The imbalance energy within the deviation band increases 
significantly as do the annual net amounts that are settled at the end of each month. In this
the monthly net imbalance energy within the deviation band is always negative (see Table 5 for 
the monthly netted energy and net charges). 
 
viation Band 2003 2004 2
Imbalance (MWh)    
Total Over-Delivery 32,71 2 32,67
T
Revenue ($000) 
Base Pay
 P
Sum
13 10 11
Unit Pri   
)  
C
1 32,59  2 
Inside Band
otal Un
10,953 9,496 
(3
10,532 
der-Delivery (32,743) 2,605) (32,712) 
Inside Band (13,249) (11,858) (12,914) 
 
13,855
 
10,530
 
12,098 ment   
Outside Band ayment @90% 886 898 891 
(912) Outside Band Charge @110% (922) (972) 
 of Inside Band Monthly netting (99) 
,
(103) (103) 
Net (Monthly Netting)
ce (¢/k
720 ,353 ,974 
Wh) 
Monthly Netting)
 
4.232Net (
% Cha
4.373  4.225 
nge over Base Case (1.42% (1.85%) (1.54%)
hange over the ±1.5% Case 0.29% 0.27% 0.32% 
 
 
Table 5.  Summary of Monthly Im lance with ±10% Deviation Band ba
  2003 2004 2005 
 Average 
(
Month
Im
yment Month
Im
yment Month
Im
yment 
Hourly 
Price 
$/MWh) 
ly Pa
Net 
balance 
(MWh) 
or 
(Charge) 
($) 
ly Pa
Net 
balance 
(MWh) 
or 
(Charge) 
($) 
ly Pa
Net 
balance 
(MWh) 
or 
(Charge) 
($) 
Jan (7,944) (7,029) 37.98 (209) (260) (9,879) (185) 
Feb 40.52 (244) (9,900) (113) (4,506) (154) (6,222) 
Mar 34.41 (277) (9,547) (314) (
(
(
( (
y 44.38 (2,296) (2 ( (2,381) (
10,811) (157) (5,402) 
Apr 38.92 (50) 
(
(1,959) (144) (5,606) (303) 11,780) 
May 28.81 238) (6,857) (183) (5,270) (339) (9,763) 
Jun 44.32 (106) (4,694) (221) (9,808) (199) (8,800) 
Jul 55.88 (163) (9,125) (60) 
(
(3,371) (92) 
(
(5,130) 
Aug 46.82 (104) (4,886) 148) (6,918) 112) (5,257) 
Sep 42.87 (232) (9,937) (167) (7,178) (135) (5,785) 
Oct 45.33 (206) (9,361) (283) 12,832) (156) (7,080) 
Nov 42.92 (295) 12,672) (257) (11,021) (308) 13,207) 
Dec 73.14 (169) (12,389) (211) (15,452) (243) (17,754) 
Yearl (99,271) ,362) 102,652) 103,209) 
 
hen the deviation band is further increased to ±20%, the revenues continue trending upward W
(see Table 6)—about 0.67% more than that in the ±1.5% case. This exercise confirms the idea 
that wider deviation band is better than narrower one, but the improvement is only marginal. 
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Table 6.  20% Deviation Band with 90%/110% Rule 
±20% De 005 viation Band 2003 2004 2
Imbalance (MWh)    
Total Over-Delivery 32,71 32,59 32,67
T
Revenue ($000) 
Base Pay
 P
Sum
13 10 12
Un    
C
1 2 2 
Inside Band
otal Un
15,856 13,787 15,149 
der-Delivery (32,743) (32,605) (32,712) 
Inside Band (20,350) (18,690) (20,023) 
 
13,855
 
10,530
 
12,098ment    
Outside Band ayment @90% 686 730 713 
(581) Outside Band Charge @110% (587) (643) 
 of Inside Band Monthly netting (196) (213) (212) 
Net (Monthly Netting)
it Cost (¢/kW
,759 ,403 ,017 
h) 
(Monthly Netting)Net 
% Cha
4.385 4.252 4.241 
nge over Base Case (1.14%) (1.37%) (1.18%) 
hange over the ±1.5% Case 0.57% 0.76% 0.69% 
 
. Sensitivity to Improved Forecast Accuracy 
he effects of improved wind power forecasting and scheduling is more noticeable. To simulate 
 of 
t 
Table 7.  15% Forecasting Improvement and ±1.5% Deviation Band with 90%/110% Rule 
3
 
T
the scheduling improvement, the hourly imbalance from the persistence method is artificially 
reduced by a fixed ratio. A two-step process is used to get the desired outcome. To simulate a 
15% improvement in forecasting accuracy over the simple persistency method, the hourly 
imbalance from the simple persistence method is first multiplied by 0.85 and then the value
the scheduled energy for the hour is modified to reflect reduced imbalance. Table 7 lists the tes
case for 15% improvement in wind forecasting (and scheduling) over the persistence. The out-of-
band (±1.5%) imbalance energy decreased 18.5%, but the increase in net revenue is small (about 
0.3% more than the base case). 
 
±1.5% Deviation Band 2003 2004 2005 
Wind Generation (MWh)    
Actual 313,7 5 283,3
Sch
Imbalance (MWh) 
tal Ov
T ( ( (
Revenue ($000) 
10,53 12,10
 Payment @
Sum
13 10 11
Un   
he ±1.5% C
71 244,65 78 
eduled 313,798 244,665 283,412 
 
27,804
 
27,703
 
27,771To er-Delivery    
Inside Band 
otal Un
6,889 
2
6,636 
2
6,822 
2der-Delivery 7,832) 7,714) 7,805) 
Inside Band (6,910) (6,775) (6,932) 
 
5 
 
3 
 
7 Base 13,86
Outside Band 90% 854 819 837 
Outside Band Charge @110% (996) (981) (963) 
 of Inside Band Monthly netting (0)* 
,7
(6) 
,3
(5) 
,9Net 
it Cost (¢/kWh) 
22 66 76 
 
4.237 Net 4.373 4.226 
% Change over t ase 0.30% 0.40% 0.33% 
*small negative amou  than $1,0
 
able 8 lists the results of the test case of a 25% improvement in forecasting accuracy. 
and 
%. 
nt less 00.00 
T
Compared to the base case, the improvement in wind forecasting decreases the out-of-b
energy by more than 30%.  However, the net revenue is only increased by a very modest 0.6
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Table 8. 25% Forecasting Improvement and ±1.5% Deviation Band with 90%/110% Rule 
±1.5% Deviation Band 2003 2004 2005 
Wind Generation (MWh)    
Actual 313,7 5 283,3
Sch
Imbalance (MWh) 
tal Ov
T ( ( (
Revenue ($000) 
10,53 12,11
 Payment @
Sum
13 10 12
Un   
he ±1.5% C
71 244,65 78 
eduled 313,795 244,664 283,408 
 
24,533
 
24,444
 
24,504To er-Delivery    
Inside Band 
otal Un
6,755 
2
6,504 
2
6,682 
2der-Delivery 4,558) 4,454) 4,534) 
Inside Band (6,770) (6,641) (6,783) 
 
1 
 
5 
 
3 Base 13,87
Outside Band 90% 726 697 712 
Outside Band Charge @110% (847) (834) (818) 
 of Inside Band Monthly netting 0 
,75
(6) 
,3
(5) 
,00Net 
it Cost (¢/kWh) 
0 93 4 
 
4.248 Net 4.382 4.236 
% Change over t ase 0.50% 0.66% 0.57% 
 
iscussions and Conclusions 
he analyses have shown that the FERC final rule of energy imbalance will have a noticeable 
 
he reason is not difficult to understand. The most critical factor for a wind plant’s revenue is its 
. 
h. 
 should be noted that in this analysis the hourly wind power schedule based on a simple 
lute 
y 
casting 
e a 
                                                
D
 
T
impact on the revenue of a wind plant. With the MISO hourly price data and actual hourly wind
production data, the rule would reduce the revenue by about 1.9% compared to an “ideal” 
scenario. With the 90%/110% stipulation in place, changing the deviation band width and 
forecasting accuracy will not have much of an effect on the result. 
 
T
actual generation (how much and when it is generated), which determines the gross revenue. The 
highest scheduling penalty under the 90%/110% rule is about 10%.5 Improvement in forecasting 
accuracy and wider deviation bands only address 10% of the revenue (under the 90%/110% rule)
Any forecasting strategy will likely end up with a very small imbalance energy over a year. (For 
shorter periods, the variation could be larger, but our simulation is focused on annual revenue.) 
The effect of different forecasting methods will place more or less energy within the deviation 
band that will be netted out at the end of the month, but those imbalances are small to begin wit
Consequently, the adjustment on the gross revenue tends to be relatively small regardless of the 
forecasting strategy and deviation band. 
 
It
persistent forecasting method actually produces very good results. The monthly mean abso
errors (MAE)6, a common metric to gauge the performance of wind power forecasting 
methodologies, of this approach are in the 7% to 8% range. The simulated 15% accurac
improvement further decreases the monthly MAE to about 6%. The key to such good fore
performance is the assumption that the hourly wind power forecasting was produced only 80 
minutes before the hour. If the market rules or actual wind power forecasting does not produc
 
5 In an extremely simplified case the maximum penalty under the 90%/110% rule will be 10%.  For example, if the 
forecasted hourly energy is constantly over the actual generation for every hour of the year, and the hourly price is 
constant for the entire year, the revenue would be 10% lower than that without the 90%/110% rule. 
6 Mean absolute error is the average magnitude of differences between the actual and scheduled wind power over a 
specified period. It is usually expressed as a percentage of wind plant installed capacity. 
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result similar to that in this analysis, the impact of the FERC energy imbalance rule will be even 
more prominent. 
 
The analysis showed that the actual penalty for wind energy under the FERC energy imbalance 
rule is not large. It can be argued that this is a reasonable price for wind power plants to pay in 
order to promote accurate scheduling and maintain system reliability. However wind is not 
capable of intentionally deviating from the schedule and a small penalty on wind power cannot 
change the nature of wind power. 
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